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TORT LIABILITY-VENDOR-VENDEE-A Vendor of
Real Estate Is Not Liable for Injuries Resulting from a
Defect on the Premises Which Existed When the Installment Sales Contract Was Entered Into, Even Though
There Was Insufficient Time for the Vendee To Repair
It before the Injury-Anderson v. Cosmopolitan National
Bank
The result reached by the Illinois Supreme Court in a recent case,
Anderson v. Cosmopolitan National Bank,1 suggests a need to examine
more closely the possible personal injury liability of sellers of real
estate under installment contracts where the injuries result from defects existing in the real estate at the time the contract is entered into
and where the buyer has had only a short period of time in which
to repair those defects. The installment contract buyer in Anderson
argued for an increased responsibility for personal injuries for installment contract sellers and for an exception to the general rule of vendor liability where the buyer has had insufficient time to repair those
defects which existed when the contract was entered into.
In Anderson, Louise Anderson rented an apartment in a Chicago
building on April 1, 1963. Legal title to the building was held by
Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago as trustee under a land trust.
William and Mary Suchier were the beneficiaries of the trust and had
full management powers over the property, including control of the
selling, renting, and handling thereof. On May 1, 1963, the Suchiers
entered into an installment contract with Jessie and Mabel Smith for
the sale of the building for $3000. The Smiths put $100 down, with
the balance to be paid in monthly installments of $100, and they took
immediate possession of the building. Pursuant to the terms of the
contract the Smiths were not entitled to a deed until all of the installment payments were made. In addition, certain rights were retained
by the Suchiers under the contract, including the right to enter and
make repairs if the buyer failed to do so, the right to add to the purchase price the cost of any insurance if the Smiths failed to keep the
1.

54 Ill. 2d 504, 301 N.E.2d 296 (1973).
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premises insured, and the right to retake possession and retain any
payments made should the Smiths fail to make one of the installment
payments.
Subsequently on May 7, 1963, Louise Anderson's three-year-old son
Robert was severely injured when he fell through a railing from which
some slats were missing in the second floor hallway of the building.
The Andersons sued both the Smiths and the Suchiers on the theory
that they both knew or should have known of the defective condition
of the railing, and that by negligently failing to repair it, they
breached their respective duties to repair it. It was undisputed that
the railing had been in a rotten and decayed condition for a long
period of time prior to April 1, 1963. The Andersons alleged that
the Smiths were asked to repair the railing, and that they never did
repair it. The Suchiers denied actual knowledge of the defect, but
it was further alleged that they should have been aware of it since
they owned the building and had expressly reserved a right to enter
for the purpose of making repairs if the Smiths failed to do so.
The trial court granted the Suchiers' motion for summary judgment
and dismissed them from the case. The court applied the general
rule that an ordinary vendor of real property is not liable for personal
injuries resulting from defects in the property sustained after a transfer of possession and control. 2 On appeal' it was urged by the Andersons that these installment contract sellers, by virtue of their special relationship with the property, were not technically vendors within
the general rule but were really more similar to landlords and should,
therefore, be held responsible for the injuries sustained. The appellate court found this position to be untenable. However, the court
reversed the summary judgment order, basing its ruling on an exception to the general rule of vendors' non-liability. The court held that
a vendor, though out of possession, is responsible for injuries where
the vendees (the Smiths in this case) have not had sufficient time
to remedy a pre-existing defect. 4 Since the accident occurred only
six days after the Smiths took possession, the court said that there
was an existing question of fact as to whether six days was sufficient
time to correct the defective condition; thus the grant of summary
judgment by the trial court was improper.
2. The general rule is stated in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 352 (1964);
see discussion beginning at p. 672 infra.
3. 132 111. App. 2d 307, 270 N.E.2d 254 (1971).
4. Id. at 312, 270 N.E.2d at 258. The exception is stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the summary judgment order. The supreme court agreed with the appellate court that
those selling real estate on installment contracts should not be subjected to a different liability than that imposed on other vendors by
virtue of the rights retained under the contracts. The court refused,
however, to recognize the exception to the general rule that the appellate court had relied on. Furthermore, the court said that, assuming
there was such an exception, the appellate court's conclusion would
have been erroneous since six days "could not reasonably be found
adequate for the simple repairs here involved." 5 Thus, while the
Andersons' rights against the Smiths were not affected by the grant
of summary judgment in favor of the Suchiers, they were effectively
deprived of any substantial recovery, since it was the Suchiers, and
not the Smiths, who were in a financial position to fully compensate
6
the Andersons.
The result in Anderson does not represent any substantial change
from the previous Illinois position. However, several issues merit
greater consideration than the courts in Anderson were inclined to
give. Accordingly, this comment will first explore the Andersons'
contention that the general rule should not have been applied because the Suchiers were not technically vendors, but really landlords.
Since -the courts' rejection of this contention was based on the conclusion that the factors of possession and control-not the specific relationship between 'the parties and the real estate-dictate liability, a
more in-depth discussion of what constitutes sufficient possession and
control to impose tort liability follows. Next, the exception to the general rule that the appellate court supported and the supreme court rejected is considered. Finally, the comment will evaluate whether the
imposition of tort liability on installment contract sellers can be justified on policy grounds.
THE GENERAL RULE-Is IT APPLICABLE?

As previously indicated, the generally accepted rule is that where
a vendor surrenders possession and control of property, he is no longer
liable to third persons injured as a result of defects existing on the
premises at the time of the transfer.7 The Illinois courts of late have
5.
6.

54 Il1. 2d at 508, 301 N.E.2d at 298.
This fact was elicited from Mr. Jerome Torshen, Esq., an attorney who rep-

resented the Andersons on the appeals, during a telephone conservation with him on
February 28, 1974.
7. See note 2 supra.
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consistently adhered to the general rule." In Porter v. Miller9 the
plaintiff was burned in a fire on property allegedly owned by the defendant. The defendant denied ownership, asserting that he had executed a contract of sale to another, who was given possession. The
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, as the purchaser
admitted being in exclusive possession and control of the real estate
at the time of the accident, and there was no agreement granting the
defendant any right to exercise dominion or control over the premises.
Similarly, in Maisenbach v. Buckner 0 the plaintiff was injured when
he tripped over a fence surrounding a parking area. The court exonerated the former owners who had maintained and repaired the fence
during their ownership, because they had surrendered title, possession,
and control pursuant to a deed. The court held that since they clearly
had no right to control the property after it was sold, there could be
no duty to third parties injured in connection with the property after
the sale.
The rationale of this general rule is that any negligence attributable
to the vendor cannot be said to be the proximate cause of any injuries
sustained while the vendor is out of possession and control. 1 The
taking of possession by the vendee constitutes an intervening cause
breaking the chain of causation. Thus, when the vendor surrenders
possession to the vendee, his liability ceases and the vendee's begins.' 2
It was the Andersons' first contention, however, that the Suchiers
were not vendors as contemplated by the general rule.' 3 In support
of this contention they pointed out that the general rule of non-liability
is effective only because of the passage of a deed of conveyance, which
represents the full agreement between the parties.' 4 With the passage
of the deed, the vendor finally and completely severs himself from
any interest in the property. The Andersons reasoned that the
Suchiers should not benefit as vendors under the general rule since
they were to convey no deed to the Smiths until all of the installment
8. See Maisenbach v. Buckner, 133 II. App. 2d 53, 272 N.E.2d 851 (1971); Conway v. Epstein, 49 Ill. App. 2d 290, 200 N.E.2d 16 (1964); Porter v. Miller, 24 Ill.
App. 2d 424, 164 N.E.2d 601 (1960); Kordig v. Grovedale Oleander Homes, Inc., 18
Ill. App. 2d 48, 151 N.E.2d 470 (1958).
9. 24 Ill. App. 2d 424, 164 N.E.2d 601 (1960).
10. 133 Ill. App. 2d 53, 272 N.E.2d 851 (1971).
11. 132 Ill. App. 2d at 313, 270 N.E.2d at 258.
12. Id.
13. See generally Brief for Plaintiff, Anderson v. Cosmopolitan National Bank, 132
Ill. App. 2d 307, 270 N.E.2d 254 (1971).

14.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 352, comment a (1964).
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payments were made, and the Suchiers did retain rights under the contract.,
Support for this proposition is sparse. In their brief the Andersons
cited a New Jersey case, Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc.,"5
where the plaintiff sued for injuries suffered after a fall on steps leading to the basement of a house, part of which the plaintiff rented from
the owners and occupiers. After recognizing the clear difference between a vendor-vendee and a landlord-tenant relationship, the court
averred that, with respect to the absolute sale involved in a vendorvendee relationship, "the vendor divests himself of title and all right
of possession or of re-entry for repairs or for any other purposes."16
The Suchiers did not divest themselves of title, and they did retain
a right of re-entry for the purpose of making repairs and were not
therefore parties to an absolute sale.
The introduction to an annotation on the subject of the liability of
vendors for defective premises appears to lend some support to a technical reading of the term "vendor":
The term "vendor or grantor" is used in this annotation to refer
to an owner of land who has entered into a contract for the sale
of his land and, by a deed of conveyance, has divested himself
of all title to such land. 7
The Anderson case was cited in this annotation as supportive of the
general rule of non-liability of "divested" vendors. Apparently the
authors misinterpreted Anderson, for at the time of the accident no
deed had been conveyed, and the Suchiers had not divested themselves of all title to the building.
It was the Andersons' second contention that since installment contract sellers are not vendors, the Suchiers should be considered as
landlords under the circumstances. As landlords, the Suchiers would
be deemed to be in control of the so-called common areas of the building and would be liable for any injuries resulting from a breach of
their attendant duty to keep those areas in good repair.' 8 In this case
the defective railing was clearly situated in a common area, and if
the Andersons could establish a landlord-tenant relationship their
chances of recovery from the Suchiers would be greatly enhanced.
15. 55 N.J. Super. 475, 151 A.2d 48 (1959).
16. Id. at 480, 151 A.2d at 51.
17. Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1027, 1030 (1973) (emphasis added).
18. See Meiners v. Moyer, 119 Ill. App. 2d 94, 255 N.E.2d 201 (1970); Myrick
v. Herrmann, 17 Ill.
App. 2d 301, 149 N.E.2d 792 (1958); Holsman v. Darling State
App. 2d 517, 128 N.E.2d 581 (1955).
Street Corp., 6 Ill.
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Although such an analogy has generally been discredited, 19 there
is a substantial similarity between a landlord's and a vendor's relation
with his property where the vendor sells under an executory installment contract:
The landlord. . .has a counterpart in the commercial vendor of
today who frequently sells his land through the investment land
contract. Such a vendor retains legal title until the final payment;
...
. Control is frequently retained by covenants to supervise the
condition and the use of the property. . . . The continuing quasiconfidential relation between vendor and vendee under the installment land contract seems substantially similar to the lessor-lessee
20
relation.
The Andersons argued in support of the analogy that collecting payments under an installment contract is similar to collecting rent and
that the payments constitute no less economic benefit to the contract
seller than rent received by the landlord. 2 1 In addition, they contended that the position of an installment contract purchaser upon default
is no better than that of a tenant when an action is brought under
the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act.2 2 The appellate court rejected
this analogy. To the court the distinction lies in what happens when
payments are made, not when they are not made. A tenant is entitled
to possession for only a limited period of time when he pays rent.
Upon the expiration of his term, he must surrender possession. But
a buyer under an installment contract is generally considered to be
the beneficial owner of the property while he makes installment payments and the outright owner when all of the payments are eventually
made. 8
Also supporting the analogy was the fact that under the contract
the Suchiers retained the right to enter and make repairs on the property if the Smiths failed to do so. However, neither the appellate
court nor the supreme court was prepared to say that a right to repair
gives rise to a duty to repair. It is evident from the decisions that
the duty to repair which is necessary before there can be tort liability
is related to possession and control. Regardless of the specific relationship between the Suchiers and the building, sufficient control to
19. See Combow v. Kansas City Ground Investment Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S.W.2d
539 (1949); Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925).

20. Comment, Liabilities For Personal Injuries From Defective Housing, 20 U. CHi.
L. REV. 273, 280 (1953).
21. 132 Ill. App. 2d at 311, 270 N.E.2d at 256; Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 14,

at 10.
22.
23.
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establish a duty to repair cannot be inferred from a reservation of
a right to enter and make repairs.
Thus, the Andersons' first argument that the Suchiers were not vendors was misplaced, since the factors given significance in establishing
tort liability under the general rule were possession and control, not
whether or not the Suchiers were technically vendors. The Illinois
courts have expressed no doubts that regardless of the character of
one's interest in the property, liability will depend upon possession
and control.2 4 In Porter v. Miller25 it was alleged that a warranty deed
was still in escrow when the plaintiff was injured, as the purchase price
was neither fully paid nor due. Summary judgment was granted for
the defendant-former owner when it was determined that he had no
right to possession, dominion, or control over the premises in question.
Whatever the relation was between the parties and the premises, the
defendant's lack of possession and control was the determining factor.
Similar reasoning was applied in Conway v. Epstein,2 6 where the
plaintiff-tenant fell down the front stairs of the apartment building
where she lived, sustaining injuries. Again, the exact nature of the
relation of the defendant to the premises was indeterminate, since the
building was in the process of being sold when the accident occurred.
Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment for the sellers,
since it was undisputed that the buyers had possession and control
of the building at the time of the accident.
It follows that the general rule is not limited to vendors. Any
person who is not in possession and control of premises, or some portion thereof, will not be liable for injuries resulting from defects in
the premises at the time of any transfer of possession and control.
The Andersons' second argument that an installment contract seller
is funotionally more similar to a landlord than a vendor is stronger in
that a landlord relationship contemplates a greater degree of possession and control.2 7 Since the Suchiers were clearly not in possession
of the building, their liability would necessarily depend on whether
they -had exercised a sufficient degree of control over the premises.
The courts in Anderson summarily dismissed the contention that the
rights retained under the contract, specifically the right to enter and
make repairs, were sufficient incidences of control to subject the
24. Koehler v. Southmoor Bank and Trust Co., 40 111. App. 2d 195, 189 N.E.2d
22 (1963).
25. 24 Ill. App. 2d 424, 164 N.E.2d 601 (1960).
26. 49 Ill. App. 2d 290, 200 N.E.2d 16 (1964).
27. See cases cited note 18 supra.
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Suchiers to liability. Due to the popularity and usefulness of the installment contract, especially with respect to lower income families,
and in light of the result in Anderson, consideration should be given
to a definition of what acts and circumstances do constitute control
sufficient to hold a seller of real property liable for injuries resulting
from defects in the property.
CONTROL AND THE AGREEMENT

To

REPAIR-THE ILLINOIS POSITION

It has long been the generally accepted position in Illinois that one
who simply covenants to repair is not liable to a tenant or subtenant
for injuries caused by a defect in the premises which was not repaired.2
The leading case in the area appears to be Cromwell v.
Allen.2 9 The plaintiff in Cromwell rented a store building on an oral
lease from the defendant, who agreed to, and did, make certain alterations and repairs before the plaintiff was to take possession. Plaintiff
claimed that the defendant had agreed to make any repairs necessary
after the plaintiff had taken possession, an averment the defendant
denied. The plaintiff had already fallen once from some broken steps
leading from a platform to the ground in the rear of the building.
Although she was not injured, she warned defendant's agent of the
poor condition of both the platform and the steps. Subsequently she
fell through one of the boards in the platform, injuring herself. Plaintiff was denied recovery, -though the court did not determine whether
the defendant had agreed to make repairs. It ruled that even if it
could be established that the defendant had covenanted to repair, the
plaintiff's injuries were necessarily too remote to be recovered as
damages for breach of contract.3 0
The court in Cromwell did recognize various situations where the
agreement to repair would render a landlord or one in a similar position liable; namely, where the covenant to repair amounts to a covenant to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, where circumstances clearly indicated that the damages or injuries sustained were
contemplated by the parties when the contract was entered into, or
where the duty to repair arises from something outside the confines
of the contract.3" Evidently there must be more than merely a general covenant to repair.
28. See Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill. App. 404 (1909); Farmer v. Alton Bldg. and
Loan Ass'n, 294 Ill. App. 206, 13 N.E.2d 652 (1938); Taylor v. Geroff, 347 I11. App.
55, 106 N.E.2d 210 (1952).
29. 151 Ill. App. 404 (1909).
30. Id. at 407.
31. Id. at 408.
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Alaimo v. DuPont3 2 is illustrative of Cromwell's first exception.
Alaimo was employed in a warehouse rented from the defendant; he
sustained fatal injuries while using a dangerously defective, antiquated
freight elevator. The defendant had agreed in the lease to make any
necessary repairs on the elevator, reserving therein also a right to enter
the premises for that purpose. The court concluded that the reservation of the additional right to enter to repair was evidence that the
parties intended the agreement to be a covenant to keep the premises,
and especially the elevator, in a reasonably safe condition and that
the defendant would be liable if the breach of the covenant to repair was the proximate cause of the accident.3" The additional right
reserved under the lease was the "something more" that Cromwell
required before tort liability would be imposed. 4
Another of the Cromwell exceptions is exemplified by Moldenhauer
v. Krynski,3" where the plaintiff on numerous occasions had asked defendant-landlord to repair some loose tiles in the bathroom and the
repairs were never made. The plaintiff was injured when she fell
trying to avoid the loose tiles. The defendant had agreed to repair
in the oral lease, but had not reserved the right to enter and repair
if necessary. However, the court determined that since the defendant
had agreed specifically to repair the tiles, the injuries were of the
type within the contemplation of the parties when the lease was
entered into, and the defendant was held to be liable for his breach. 6
There is, on the other hand, authority contrary to the Cromwell
holding that a mere covenant to repair is not sufficient to impose liability. In Sontag v. O'Hare3 7 decedent and her family rented a first
floor flat in a building owned by the defendant. There was evidence
to support a finding that the defendant had agreed to repair the premises, which included a back porch, stairs, and a rotted and worm-eaten
railing. The decedent was fatally injured when the railing broke, and
she fell several feet to the ground below. The court said that the
defendant would be liable for his breach of the agreement to repair
32. 4 Ill. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1954).
33. Id. at 92, 123 N.E.2d at 586.
34. See also Gula v. Gawel, 71 Ill. App. 2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966), where
it was held that a landlord's retention of a key to plaintiff's apartment for the purpose
of making repa;rs and the fact that the landlord had in fact used the key to enter and
repair were sufficient, when coupled with a provision in an oral lease that the landlord
would repair and maintain the premises, to give rise to a duty to maintain the premises
in a reasonably safe condition.
35. 62 Ill. App. 2d 382, 210 N.E.2d 809 (1965).
36. Id. at 390, 210 N.E.2d at 813; accord, Page v. Ginsberg, 345 Ill. App. 68, 102
N.E.2d 65 (1951).
37. 73 Ill. App. 432 (1897).
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if the breach was the proximate cause of the injury.
This minority position also finds support in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the
lessee or his sublessee by a condition of disrepair existing before
or arising after the lessee has taken possesion if
(a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the
lease or otherwise to keep the land in repair . . . .. 38
The Restatement also makes it clear that liability rests in tort, and
not upon a contract.3 9 A covenant to repair implies the reservation
of a right to enter the premises for the purpose of making repairs,
and if the covenant and the reservation are considered together, there
is control sufficient to sustain tort liability. The implied right to enter
and repair is the "something more" required by Cromwell before tort
liability will be imposed for breach of an agreement to repair.
The minority position seems to be the better one. When the landlord agrees to repair, often the tenant will rely on that agreement,
and forego efforts to remedy any dangerous and defective situations.
The reliance is not unreasonable, since generally lower income families are at the mercy of the landlords and have no independent power
to bargain for an improved position as tenant.
CONTROL WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT TO REPAIR

Where the landlord does not agree in the lease to make repairs,
the courts can look to other lease provisions in making their determination as to whether control sufficient to impose tort liability on
a landlord has been retained. Apparently in Illinois the mere reservation of a right to enter for the purpose of making repairs will not
give rise to a duty that would subject the party reserving the right
to tort liability, and in this respect the courts in Anderson ruled
correctly.
In Jackson v. 919 Corp."° the plaintiff was injured while walking
on a public sidewalk when she was struck by glass from a store window
that broke as she approached. The lessee of the building was
required to keep the premises in repair and immediately replace any
plate glass which might become damaged. No right to enter for the
38.
39.
40.
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purposes of inspection and repair was reserved by the lessor, but he
did reserve the right to remove any objectionable signs or advertising.
The plaintiff's theory was that since the lessor's employees made daily
inspections of the outside front of the building, the lessor-owner retained control over the outer windows, including the one that broke.
The court, in rejecting the plaintiff's contention, noted that since the
reservation of a right to enter and repair by itself would not render
the lessor-owner liable, it naturally followed that the informal inspections, not involving any entry into the building, could not constitute
control of the premises. 4'
No Illinois authority was cited for the court's statement that merely
42
reserving a right to enter and repair would be insufficient control,
yet it would appear that this position has been adopted in Illinois as
a result of Jackson. Rather than examining the singular element of
the reservation of the right to enter and repair, the courts have looked
at the totality of the acts and circumstances in each case in determining whether there is control.
As an example, in Breazeale v. Chicago Title and Trust Co.4" the
fact that the landlord's employee vacuumed a leased apartment weekly
was held not to be such control that would carry with it a duty to
replace the shabby carpet, and the plaintiff-tenant was denied recovery
from the landlord after she had tripped on the carpet, sustaining injuries. Previously, the plaintiff had complained that the living room
carpet was shabby and that it had a hole in it and was assured by
the landlord that new carpets were ordered and would be installed
shortly. The plaintiff's complaint went more to the appearance of the
carpet and not particularly to any element of risk involved therein.
Thus, the court implied that the weekly vacuuming was a ministerial
duty and did not create a legal duty to keep the premises safe. The
result seems harsh, though, as it is reasonable to assume that an old
and shabby carpet is implicitly dangerous, especially when the condition is called to the landlord's attention.
There also appeared to be substantial indicia of possession and control in Drewick v. Republic Steel Corp.,44 but the court refused to
find control. In Drewick the plaintiff was struck by a window which
fell or was blown from a building, part of which was occupied by the
41.

Id. at 526, 101 N.E.2d at 597.

42. The court relied on an Oregon case, Nash v. Goritson, 174 Ore. 368, 149 P.2d
325 (1944), distinguishing the leading case in the area, Appel v. Muller, 262 N.Y. 278,
186 N.E. 785 (1933); see also discussion beginning at p. 680 infra.
43. 293 Ill. App. 269, 12 N.E.2d 217 (1938).

44.

97 Il. App. 2d 187, 240 N.E.2d 524 (1967).
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lessee corporation. Under the lease the lessee had agreed generally
to repair, but the defendant-lessor agreed to repair any damage to
the premises occasioned by its own acts. Nothing in the evidence
indicated that the defect which resulted in the plaintiff's injury was
caused by the lessor. Aside from this lease provision, the plaintiff
asserted that additonal factors necessarily carried an implication of the
lessor's possession and control. The plaintiff pointed to the fact that
the president of both the lessor and lessee corporations was one and
the same person, the fact that he maintained his office in the portion
of the building from which the window fell, and the fact that he had
papers in his desk pertaining to the defendant-lessor's business. The
court succinctly stated that, even considered together, those facts were
not sufficient to impose liability.4 5
46
In contrast sufficient control was established in Patterson v. Stern,
where the plaintiff fell through a guardrail on the outside wall of
a part of a building leased to the plaintiff's employer by the defendant. Although the lessee had agreed to keep the leased premises in good repair, the defendant-lessor reserved both the right to
enter the leased premises in order to repair, and the right to alter
the building by making several improvements, including some in the
area where the guardrail was located. Under these circumstances the
plaintiff was allowed to recover, since the lessor was said to be responsible for the area in question.
Thus, in Illinois where there is no agreement that the landlord is
to repair the premises, there must be something in addition to a reservation of the right to enter and repair in order to establish sufficient
control, and that something will be determined by the circumstances
of the particular case. Contrast the Illinois view with the position the
New York courts have taken. In Appel v. Muller 47 the court said
that the landlord, by merely reserving the right to enter the premises
to make any necessary repairs in the lease,
had never parted so completely with possession and control that
he divested himself from performing his duty of care toward
travelers upon the street. He continued under the duty to keep
his building in a safe condition; he reserved the power to perform
48
this duty; he was liable.
One basis for holding such a landlord liable is that the reason for
45.
46.
47.
48.
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protecting him against a lessee's negligence, i.e., his inability to gain
access to the premises to make the necessary repairs, is lacking. 49
The holding in Appel was limited to make lessors liable only to
third persons outside the premises, e.g., pedestrians. This distinguishig fact has been adhered to when Appel has been followed," although
it might be argued that if one had control with respect to pedestrians,
he should also have had control with respect to possessors. 5'
Appel, however, has not always been followed. The court in
People v. Scott52 refused to permit a finding of control sufficient to
hold a landlord liable where the reservation of a right of entry to make
repairs was not coupled with a concomitant covenant to repair. However, Scott is distinguishable from Appel since it was a criminal case,
and the court would not strive to find control in order to attach criminal responsibility. 3
Admittedly the difference between these cases and Anderson is that
the issue in these cases was whether a landlord or a lessor had retained
sufficient control over his premises to subject him to liability, and in
Anderson the Suchiers were not the landlords of the building but were
contract sellers. But as long as the emphasis is to be on possession
and control, and not on the relationship of the person to the property,
the principles just enunciated should be applicable in a case like Anderson. Under such principles, however, even if the Anderson case
had been decided in New York, the Andersons probably would not
have been able to sustain an argument that the Suchiers retained sufficient control over the building to render them liable in tort, since the
Andersons were tenants, not members of the general public. However, they might have received a more -thorough explanation of the
elements of possession and control from the New York courts.
AN

EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE

Both the surpeme court and the appellate court in Anderson noted
a well-recognized exception to the general rule of vendors' non-lia49. See generally Fjellman v. Weller, 213 Minn. 457, 7 N.W.2d 521 (1942); Johnson v. Prague-Guessenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W.2d 723 (1942); City of Dalton
v. Anderson, 72 Ga. App. 109, 33 S.E.2d 115 (1945).
50. See King v. Lenko Realty, 22 Misc. 2d 376, 191 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
where the reservation of a right to enter the premises and repair was found to vest
the owner with sufficient control to render him liable to a member of the public; McCabe v. Century Theatres Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 154, 268 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1966).
51. See Comment, Torts-Liability of a Landlord for Injuries to Persons on the
Premises-Effect of Repairs Made Under Such Covenant Subject to an Injury Caused
by Defect Repaired, 48 MICH. L. REv. 689, 697 (1950); but see Rayonier v. United
States, 225 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1955).
52. 26 N.Y.2d 286, 258 N.E.2d 206, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1970).

53.

Id. at 291, 258 N.E.2d at 210, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
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bility," supported by the Restatement. Under the exception a vendor
will remain liable in tort even after a transfer of possession and control
when he consciously deceives his vendee by concealing or failing to
disclose a dangerous condition known to him but not reasonably expected to be known to the vendee5 5 Liability continues until the vendee has discovered the defect and has had a reasonable amount of
time to remedy it." Although this concealed defect exception was not
applicable in Anderson, it serves as a useful basis for explaining the
divergence of opinion between the supreme court and the appellate
court with regard to recognizing another exception to the general rule.
Having rejected the Andersons' contentions that the Suchiers were
not technically vendors, but were more akin to landlords, and having
held that in any event the Suchiers had not exercised a sufficient degree of possession and control to impose tort liability, the appellate
court offered a second exception to the general rule of non-liability
for vendors.6 7 This exception, supported by the Restatement, would
hold a vendor who is out of possession and control liable even when
a vendee takes possession with knowledge of the defect, if sufficient
time has not elapsed by the time of the accident to allow the vendee
to repair the defect.5" Furthermore, -the protection extends to any
person to whom the vendee has leased or sold. 59 Since the Andersons
rented their apartment from the vendees (the Smiths), they could
assert this exception.
To the appellate court there was an existing question of fact as to
whether six days was a reasonable amount of time for the Smiths, as
vendees, to correct the defect, and such a factual issue could only be
resolved by the jury. In so holding, -the court relied on a New York
case, Farragherv. New York,60 a wrongful death action on behalf of
a fireman who died fighting a fire because the premises lacked an
automatic sprinkler system required by 'law. The evidence indicated
that it would have taken about ninety days to install a proper sprinkler
system, and that the vendee had taken title to the premises less than
ninety days before the accident."
Thus, the vendee in Farragher
54.
257.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.
60.

54 Ill. 2d at 507, 301 N.E.2d at 298; 132 IlM. App. 2d at 313, 270 N.E.2d at
RFSTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 353(1) (1964).

Id. § 353(2).
132 Ill. App. 2d at 312, 270 N.E.2d at 257.

RESTATEMENT (SmeoN)
Id. at 236, comment a.

OF ToRa

§ 353(2) (1964).

26 App. Div. 2d 494, 275 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1966).

61. The court said that since the vendee would not commence installment of such
a system before it took title, the time period ran from the date title was passed, and
not from the date of the contract. Id. at 496, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 545. However, it is
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could not possibly have remedied the defect by the time the accident
occurred, and, accordingly, the vendor was held to be liable.
The origins of this "reasonable time to repair" exception favored
by Farragherare traceable to early New York case law. In Pharm
v. Lituchy 62 the vendee was not notified of a defective ceiling in the
plaintiff's apartment when the premises were conveyed to him by the
defendant. One day after the conveyance the ceiling collapsed, injuring the plaintiff. The court found against the defendant-vendor since
there clearly had not been a reasonable opportunity for the vendee
to remedy the defect. The fact that the defect in the ceiling was
concealed from the vendee by the vendor played no part in the court's
conclusion; it said that there was no reason to consider the concealed
defect exception to the general rule of vendors' non-liability. 63
In subsequent cases twelve days,"6 thirty-two days," 5 nine months, 66
and four years, 67 were held to have been sufficient time for the vendee
to repair the defects in the absence of concealment. In any case the
determination of what is a reasonable length of time must be made
according to the circumstances of the particular case, including consideration of such factors as the amount of time elapsed, the nature
of the condition, and the use made of the land by the vendee. 68
The Illinois Supreme Court was not convinced that this exception
should be adopted. It asserted that the reasonable time to repair exception had not found acceptance outside New York, and it refused
to apply the exception generally to exculpate vendees in situations
such as the one in Anderson." Farragherwas distinguished on the
ground that special circumstances were involved in that case, i.e., that
it would have been impossible to make the required installation in
the amount of time the vendee had been in possession, whereas in
Anderson it could not be shown to be impossible to fix the railing
within six days. Even if the court had recognized the exception, it
would have disagreed with the conclusion of the appellate court based
also interesting to note that the accident occurred within ninety days from the date
when the contract was entered into. Id.
62.
63.
64.
N.Y.),
65.

283 N.Y. 130, 27 N.E.2d 811 (1940).
Id. at 13, 27 N.E.2d at 81.
Kibuik v. Windsor Residences, 183 Misc. 499, 52 N.Y.S.2d 326 (City Ct. of
rev'd on uncertain grounds, 184 Misc. 186, 54 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
Rufo v. S. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 268 App. Div. 1057, 52 N.Y.S.2d 469, a!I'd,

295 N.Y. 981, 68 N.E.2d 60 (1946).
66. Zeledon v. Bowery Say. Bank, 195 Misc. 933, 85 N.E.2d 414 (Sup. Ct.), appeal
dismissed, 276 App. Div. 898, 95 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1948).

67. Tri-Boro Bowling Center v. Roosevelt Eighty-Fifth Estates, 77 N.Y.S.2d 74
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
68.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 353, comment g (1964).

69. 54 Il1.2d at 508, 301 N.E.2d at 298.
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thereon, since the supreme court found that as a matter of law six
days would have been sufficient time for the vendees to make the
necessary repairs.7 ° In other words before a vendor will be held liable
there must be no way for the vendee to remedy the defect in the
period of time between the taking of possession and the accident.
The weaknesses and the inconsistencies of the supreme court
majority's opinion were ably pointed out by the two dissenters, Justices
Goldenhersh and Kluczynski. 7 ' They reasoned that the effect of the
reasonable time to repair exception would not be to exonerate the
vendee completely, but merely to allow the factual issues to be decided
on the evidence and by the trier of fact.7 2 Moreover, there is a basic
inconsistency in accepting the concealed defect exception and rejecting
the reasonable time to repair exception:
The same rationale which imposes liability upon one who sells property with a concealed, defective, dangerous condition until discovery, and until there has been an opportunity to repair, compels
the conclusion that a vendor who sells property with a visibly
dangerous defect should be held liable until a reasonably sufficient
time has elapsed to permit the vendee to repair it. The only difference between the two situations is that in the case of the concealed defect the reasonable period of time commences to run from
discovery, and in the case of the patently dangerous defect, from
the time of relinquishment of the right to possession and control.
In either instance, whether there 73has been a reasonable opportunity to repair is a question of fact.
The logic of this reasoning is undeniable, and if a similar situation
arises in the future, the court would do well to draw on this language.
Especially displeasing to the dissent was the majority's ruling as a
matter of law that six days was a reasonable opportunity to make the
"simple repairs" on the railing. There was no evidence in the record
to support the conclusion that the repairs were simple. The rotten
condition of the railing might easily have been so extensive as to require reconstruction, and not merely replacement of a rail.7 4
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Underlying the basic issues in the Anderson case is the question
of whether there are valid policy reasons for holding the Suchiers
liable in tort as vendors under an installment contract for the sale of
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.

Id. at 509-11, 301 N.E.2d at 299-300 (dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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real estate. On behalf of the vendors it can be said that to hold them
liable in tort might be a restriction on the Illinois policy favoring the
free alienability of land. Any trend toward holding installment contract sellers responsible for personal injuries sustained after they have
given up possession of the premises and retained some degree of control therein may deprive many people of their only available method
for purchasing real estate. Sellers would be more reluctant to dispose
of their property in light of an increased risk that they might be subjected to tort liability. Nevertheless, the concealed defect exception
has established the propriety of holding a vendor liable subsequent
to a transfer of possession and control.
On the other hand, there appear to be basic inequities in the
economic realities of the real estate installment sales contract. 75 Due
to the frequently poor financial position of the buyer and his general
inability to obtain other types of financing, his power to bargain with
the seller for improved conditions under the contract is virtually nonexistent. For example, under an installment contract the buyer has
no equity of redemption: if he defaults on one payment he can be
evicted, 76 and the seller is allowed to retain all payments previously
77
made under the contract as liquidated damages.
The courts, however, often struggle to find ways to protect the defaulting vendee and continue the contract. 78 Thus, forfeiture provisions may be struck down when their application would shock the conscience. 79 Similarly, waiver of the forfeiture provision might be found
where a vendor accepts payments made after a notice of forfeiture.8 0
Recent legislation has also attempted to improve the position of a
buyer under an installment contract. Contract buyers now have a
limited equity of redemption when the court determines that the total
unpaid amount of the contract is less than 75 % of the original purchase
price. 81
75.

J.

CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY

129 (1962) [hereinafter cited

as CRIBBET].

76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, § 2 (1973).
77. See generally CRIBBET, supra note 75, at 128-30.
78. Id. at 129.
79. See Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Burton v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 401V U.S. 928 (1971).
80. Zeta Bldg. Corp. v. Garst, 408 Ill. 519, 97 N.E.2d 331 (1951). The court in
Garst also distinguished between notice of an intent to declare a forfeiture and declara-

tion of a forfeiture. Since the contract involved called for the giving of notice of an
intent to declare a forfeiture, a declaration of a forfeiture by the sellers without having
given such notice was insufficient to forfeit the contract. Id. at 523, 97 N.E.2d at 333.
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, § 13 (1973). See also Bernard, Legal Aspects of the
1961 Mortgages and Redemption Law Legislation in Illinois, 43 CHI. BAR RECORD
229, 245 (1962), which points out that the applicable percentage is the percentage of
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In any event the vendor should not be permitted to shift responsibility by merely selling his property, especially in light of statutes
which require that property owners who furnish housing to others furnish safe and decent housing. Congress has declared it to be the national policy of the United States
to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and
the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings. . .that
are injurious
to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of
82
the Nation.
The State of Illinois has also recognized the need for repair and
maintenance of housing facilities, providing that:
No person, being the owner, occupant or lessee of any building
or other structure which is so occupied or so situated as to endanger persons or property, shall permit such building or structure
by reason of faulty construction, age, lack of proper repair, or
any other cause. . .to become liable to cause injury or damage
by collapsing or otherwise. 83
The imposition of tort liability upon parties in the position of the
Suchiers would be in furtherance of federal and state goals to provide
safe and decent housing for all.
CONCLUSION

The significance of Anderson lies in its failure to justify adequately
the conclusions eventually reached by the court. With the substantial
use of the installment contract with respect to real estate sales, the
issue of control is vital, and it deserved closer discussion than it received. Perhaps the willingness of the courts of New York to find
sufficient control upon which to base tort liability in some circumstances when a landlord merely reserves in the lease the right to enter
the premises for the purpose of making any repairs foreshadows a
change in the position of the Illinois courts in the near future.
In addition, the supreme court decision exonerated vendors of real
property containing a dangerous, defective condition without a fair determination of whether real responsibility had in fact been shifted
from the Suchiers to the Smiths within the six-day period between
the taking of possession of the building by the Smiths and the accident.
the total purchase price represented by the unpaid balance. In other words, a buyer
might have paid more than 25% of the purchase price, but the total unpaid balance can
still exceed 75% of the original purchase price when taxes, insurance commissions, attorneys' fees, and court costs are included in the latter calculation. Id.
82. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3301
(1970); 42 U.S.C. § 3931 (1970).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1271/2 § 9 (1973).
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To hold as a matter of law that six days was a reasonable length of
time in which to make the necessary repairs, without substantial
evidence as to the extent of the defect, completely undermines the
role of a jury in a civil case.
The supreme court's refusal to recognize the reasonable time to repair exception is unfortunate. The responsibility for defective housing should be placed where it may be exercised. The vendee of housing containing a concealed defect is not held responsible until he
knows about, and can physically correct, that defect. He cannot have
the responsibility for repairing that of which he is unaware. Likewise,
a vendee who is aware of a defect when the contract is entered into
cannot exercise responsibility when he cannot reasonably repair the
defect because he lacks adequate time.
Acceptance and application of the reasonable time to repair exception, in addition to being consistent with acceptance of the established
concealed defect exception, would give plaintiffs like the Andersons
the opportunity to have the jury, not the judges, decide a question
of fact vital to their case. Recognition of the exception would also
be a small step toward a more logical allocation among vendors and
vendees of responsibility for personal injuries resulting from defective housing. That small step should be taken in Illinois.
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